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:: quadchain / proof-carrying context ::
prompt -- compress -- verify
+ source chain + compression chain + proof chain + anchor chain + verify before trust +
quadchain agent
chat with the trace first
three turns in, it flips into a wrapped-style proof reveal: token stats, trace diff, verifier mechanics.
drop a noisy trace or describe the handoff you want compressed. after three turns i will reveal the verified packet.
0/3 turns before reveal
Trace contexteditable
turn 1: intentturn 2: evidence mapturn 3: wrapped reveal
Single-context reduction
38.53%
2,250 raw tokens became 1,383 verified tokens.
Evidence preserved
41/41
Required evidence survived the compressed packet.
Concepts preserved
38/38
Answer-critical concepts stayed present.
Workflow reduction
74.63%
9,000 raw multiagent tokens became 2,283 routed tokens.
Adversarial rejection
4/4
Tampered, stale, and unsafe handoffs were rejected.
Benchmark rows
2,880
Paired offline rows across methods, budgets, and seeds.
Live trust packet
This receipt is generated by the app verifier at render time.
- Certificate
- qchain_fdcf13bc9578
- Handoff
- handoff_892c3c92b331
- Merkle root
- sha256:fdcf13bc9578db21e
- Registry receipt
- local:qchain_fdcf13bc9578
- Answer readiness
- 1
- Failures
- none
What it protects
error
MissingStateCookieError
fix
SameSite=Lax
policy
Do not disable csrf checks.
Role routing
The win is not just smaller packets. Each agent gets the smallest verified packet for its job.
9,000 raw -> 2,283 verified, 74.63% saved
| Role | Mode | Raw | Quadchain | Saved | Evidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Researcher | Compressed packets plus proof envelope | 2,250 | 487 | 78.36% | 14/14 |
| Implementer | Compressed packets plus proof envelope | 2,250 | 1,376 | 38.84% | 27/27 |
| Reviewer | Certificate summaries for all packets | 2,250 | 240 | 89.33% | 41/41 |
| Judge presenter | Aggregate certificate plus registry receipt | 2,250 | 180 | 92% | 41/41 |
Stage line
Quadchain makes agent memory handoffs trustworthy. One agent can compress its work, another agent can verify the certificate, and private context stays off-chain while hashes and roots make tampering visible.